Louisiana State University

LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses

Graduate School

2002

The Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902): development of the U.S.
Army's counterinsurgency policy
Frank L. Andrews
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrews, Frank L., "The Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902): development of the U.S. Army's
counterinsurgency policy" (2002). LSU Master's Theses. 1318.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/1318

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in LSU Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.

THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION (1899-1902):
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. ARMY’S
COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for a degree of
Master of Arts in Liberal Arts
In
The Interdepartmental Program
in Liberal Arts

by
Frank L. Andrews
B.S. United States Military Academy, 1990
August 2002

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my family for their
support while I have pursued my master’s degree.

I owe an

eternal debt of gratitude to my wife, Elaine, for bearing
not only the demands of being an army spouse, but also the
additional ones imposed by being the wife of a graduate
student.

She graciously sacrificed her time to care for

our four children, while I was busy researching and
writing my thesis.

I would also like to thank Dr. Stanley

Hilton for his invaluable assistance.

While he proofread

my drafts with a critical eye and greatly improved the
quality of this work, I alone am responsible for any
errors.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents who

instilled in me the value of an education.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ii

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION

. . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . .

1

2

THE ARMY ON THE EVE OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . 14

3

CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS AND BENEVOLENT
ASSIMILATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

4

A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR

5

THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS

6

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

BIBLIOGRAPHY
VITA

. . . . . . . . . . . 50

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

iii

ABSTRACT

Counterinsurgency is one of the most difficult forms
of conflict an army can face.

After defeating Spanish

forces in Manila during the Spanish-American War, a welldeveloped insurrection, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, challenged
the United States Army for nearly four years.

Although the

army in 1898 was unprepared for a large-scale, two-front
war, it conducted an extremely effective counterinsurgency
campaign 7000 miles from home in inhospitable terrain.
Despite lacking a formal, written counterinsurgency
doctrine, the frontier experiences of the army, orally
passed on from one generation of soldiers to the next,
provided invaluable lessons that could be applied in the
Philippines.

This was only of limited benefit, however,

since the vast majority of soldiers who fought in the
Philippines were volunteers, with limited military
experience.

The army’s senior leaders, many veterans of

the Civil War and Indian campaigns, were able to apply
their experiences and develop effective strategies to
counter the insurrection.

General Elwell S. Otis

iv

immediately realized that a military solution alone would
not end the insurgency.

By implementing President William

McKinley’s policy of benevolent assimilation, Otis
attempted drive a wedge between the Philippine people and
the guerrillas.

The insurgents countered this tactic by

resorting to a campaign of terror to insure continued
support from the people.

Otis’ subordinates, realizing

policy of attraction had failed, then developed and
implemented a strategy designed to isolate the guerillas
from their base of support, the village, and then defeat
the guerrillas militarily.

This strategy, belatedly

endorsed by General Arthur MacArthur, eventually caused the
collapse of the insurrection in many areas of the
Philippines.

In the final stages of the conflict, the army

adopted more repressive measures, which stiffened
resistance.

Only when the Americans employed the policies

of conciliation and repression in the correct proportion
were they able to end the insurrection.

v

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The brutal repression of the rebellion in Cuba by the
Spanish in 1896 captured America’s attention as the
jingoistic press denounced the Spanish commander, General
Valeriano “Butcher” Weyler.

As thousands of Cubans died

in detention camps, Congress passed a resolution proposing
that the United States “employ its good offices to gain
Spain’s recognition of Cuban independence.”1

Faced with

increasing pressure for American intervention, newly
elected President William McKinley attempted to find a
diplomatic solution to the crisis.

However, the USS Maine

exploded and sank in the Havana harbor on the night of
February 15, 1898, effectively ending McKinley’s efforts
to avoid a war between the United States and Spain.
Ten days later, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Theodore Roosevelt, secretly cabled Commodore George

1

John Elsberg, ed., Army Historical Series, American
Military History, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center
of Military History, 1989), pp. 320-321.

1

2
Dewey, Commander of the Asiatic squadron, informing him
that, in the event of war, he was to conduct offensive
operations against the Spanish fleet in the Philippine
Islands.

On April 22, three days after Congress declared

war, Dewey received his orders to “proceed at once to the
Philippines” and capture or destroy the Spanish fleet.2

As

Dewey steamed from Hong Kong towards Manila Bay and glory,
he could not have foreseen the consequences of his
resounding victory over the Spanish fleet on May 1.
America’s involvement in the Philippines began after Dewey
requested additional manpower from Washington, since he
lacked the ground troops necessary to defeat the Spanish
garrison in Manila.

Two days later, the Secretary of War,

Russell Alger, ordered 5,000 troops to the Philippines.
With the eventual defeat of the Spanish, the United
States would inherit not only the Philippine archipelago,
but also an insurrection that the Spanish had been
fighting for some time.

This would be America’s first

experience with modern guerilla warfare.

Over 126,000

American soldiers served in the Philippines.

The total

cost would be $400 million, with 4,234 Americans killed in

2

Stanley Karnow, In Our Image, America’s Empire in the
Philippines (New York: Ballentine Books, 1989), pp. 101-2.
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action, thousands more wounded, and tens of thousands of
Filipino casualties.3
Despite the accidental nature of America’s
involvement in the Philippines, the United States Army was
able to wage what one historian has called its most
successful counterinsurgency campaign of all time.4

What

makes the army’s success surprising is that in 1898, the
army was completely unprepared to fight a large-scale war
7,000 miles from the United States.

Furthermore, the

Commander in Chief, President McKinley, failed to provide
clear guidance to his generals in the field.

In fact,

after McKinley dispatched troops to the Philippines, he
told a friend that he “could not have told where those
darned island were within two thousand miles.”5

McKinley

certainly did not grasp the size and intensity of the
Filipino rebellion against the Spanish.

More importantly,

he failed to consider what potential impact the insurgency
might have on the American forces sent to fight the
Spanish in the Philippines.
American victory in the Philippine Insurrection was
not a foregone conclusion, as some have argued.

3

In 1898,

Ronald E. Dolan, Philippines, A Country Study (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 6.
4
Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), p. 324.
5
Karnow, In Our Image, p. 105.

4
the Regular Army numbered only 27,000 soldiers.

The

nation lacked a pool of trained reserves and the National
Guard suffered from poor training, leadership, and
outdated equipped.

Initially, the Cuban theater of the

Spanish-American War was the higher priority for troops,
receiving a majority of the Regular Army units.

Later,

the Boxer Rebellion in China reduced the number of
soldiers available to fight in the Philippines.

Even when

American troop strength peaked in 1901, the Filipino
insurgents outnumbered American forces by a ratio of at
least two to one.

The army also lacked a formal written

counterinsurgency doctrine.

Counter-insurgency, as

defined in current army doctrine, encompasses “those
military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to
defeat insurgency.”6

Given all these problems, how was the

army able to develop and implement an effective
counterinsurgency policy to pacify the Philippines?
To answer this question, one must first realize that,
since its inception, the army had fought numerous
unconventional enemies and conducted several large-scale
pacification operations.

6

Additionally, experiences and

Field Manual 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics
(Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1997), p. 1-40.
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lessons learned during the Civil War and the Indian
campaigns, while not directly applicable in the
Philippines, gave army leaders experience in fighting an
irregular enemy.

Secondly, from the beginning of the

Philippine Insurrection, senior army leaders realized that
military actions alone would not solve the problems in the
Philippines.

Instead, they correctly deduced that the

solution was primarily a political one.
By successfully implementing the policy of
attraction, in the form of President McKinley’s idea of
benevolent assimilation, the American government offered
the Filipinos basically the same things they initially had
fought to secure from the Spanish, namely, political,
economic, and social reforms.

When conventional military

operations and the policy of attraction failed to end the
insurgency, commanders in the field employed the policy of
chastisement through the measured use of force under the
provisions of General Orders 100.

By using conciliation

and repression in the correct proportion, American
military leaders developed a policy that undermined the
insurgents’ will to resist.

Finally, United States

authorities utilized an effective three-pronged strategy
designed to win the support of the local inhabitants,

6
isolate the insurgents from the populace, and defeat the
guerrillas militarily in the field.
The army did not develop effective counterinsurgency
policies overnight.

Initially focused on conventional

military operations and civic actions, the army was slow
to react to a change to guerrilla warfare by Emilio
Aguinaldo, the leader of the Philippine revolutionary
movement.

Additionally, the commanding generals failed to

devise an all-encompassing strategy to defeat the
insurrection.

Instead, they endorsed policies that their

subordinate commanders had created, implemented, and
proven effective.

It would take over a year of trial and

error to find the correct balance between the policies of
attraction and chastisement.

Since support for the

insurrection varied from island to island, and even within
provinces on the same island, commanders had to determine
which policies to apply.

In fact, fighting took place in

only thirty-four of the seventy-seven provinces in the
Philippines.7

The personality of the commander would also

determine the pacification policy his units would utilize.
By studying the policies of senior army leaders and the
campaigns their subordinates conducted in different areas,

7

Linn, The Philippine War, p. 185.

7
one can determine the effectiveness of the various
pacification approaches used by each commander.
The geography of the Philippine archipelago would
also play an important role, dictating that units be
dispersed over wide areas, leaving subordinate commanders
even greater flexibility to pacify their sectors.

The

archipelago consists of over 7,000 islands, of which only
500 are larger than one square mile.

In 1898, the total

population of the Philippine Islands was well over
7,000,000 inhabitants, spread among 1,000 islands;
however, over 95 percent of the people lived on the eleven
largest islands.8
The geography of the islands led to the development
of an extremely diverse population.

The eighty-seven

tribal groups in the Philippines spoke eight languages
with over seventy different dialects.

Luzon alone had

five major groups (the largest being the Tagalogs), all of
which spoke different languages.

As a result of Spanish

rule and the influence of the friars, the majority of the
population was Catholic, while the southern islands,
Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, were primarily Moslem.
Manila was the largest city with a population of over
8

Kenneth Ray Young, The General’s General: The Life and
Times of General Arthur MacArthur (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
Inc., 1994), p. 180; Karnow, In Our Image, p. 38.
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300,000; however, most of the people lived in small towns
and villages concentrated along the coasts.

The interior

areas were mountainous and contained thick jungles, with
few roads, railroads, or trails.

The rainy season lasted

from the end of May until October, making normally
difficult movement in the interior nearly impossible.9
Divided by geography, religion, language, race, and
culture, the inhabitants of the Philippines were never
able to unify to oppose foreign intervention.

As a

result, Spain faced little resistance when it colonized
the islands in 1565.

The Spanish imported the same forced

labor (repartimiento) and taxation and land-grabbing
systems (encomienda) they had used in Mexico.

Catholic

friars, when not busy promoting Christianity, acquired
large estates and oversaw the local government and tax
system.

Over time, Filipino resentment against Spanish

rule and the abuses of the friars grew steadily.10
The Philippine revolutionary movement had its origins
in a worker’s rebellion at an arsenal in the province of
Cavite on January 20, 1872.

Resentful of being treated as

second-class citizens by the peninsulares, many

9

Young, The General’s General, p. 180; Karnow, In Our
Image, p. 38.
10
Karnow, In Our Image, pp. 49-51, pp. 57-58.
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criollos11 had begun to identify more with the Filipinos
than the Spanish.

A disgruntled criollo army sergeant

planned the uprising.

The Spanish brutally suppressed the

revolt, publicly executing three criollo priests
implicated in the plot.

This left behind “a sullen

resentment that would be exploited by a later
revolutionary movement.”12
The future leaders of the revolutionary movement were
sons of the wealthy mestizo or indio families, or were
lawyers, doctors, and other professionals.

They had been

educated in Manila or attended European universities.
Eventually they formed “a small intellectual and
professional community in Manila that transcended ethnic
barriers.”13

These ilustrados, or enlightened ones,

initially wanted equality between Filipinos and Spaniards
living in the Philippines, not independence.

As Spanish

authorities refused to implement even moderate reforms,

11

Society in the Philippine Islands was stratified
socially, ethnically, culturally, and economically. In
descending order were the penisulares (Spaniards from Spain),
criollos (Spaniards born in the Philippines), followed by those
of mixed blood, Spanish mestizos and Chinese mestizos. At the
bottom were the indios, or native Filipinos. Ibid., p. 62.
12
Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent Assimilation” The
American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1982), p. 32. For a description of the
revolt, see Karnow, In Our Image, pp. 65-67.
13
John Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1973), p. 10.
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however, many ilustrados became convinced that revolution
was the only available alternative.
A national consciousness was slowly forming among
many Filipinos.

Dr. José Rizal, founder of the Philippine

League and an informal spokesman for the “Propaganda
Movement,” wrote the novel Noli Me Tangere, in which he
protested Spanish rule in the Philippines and criticized
the policies and wealth of the friars.

This book had the

same galvanizing effect on Filipinos as Harriet Beecher
Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin had on Americans living in the
pre-Civil War North.14

Because Rizal’s book stimulated the

growing Filipino nationalist spirit, the Spanish exiled
him in 1892.

Later arrested in Barcelona and convicted of

organizing rebellions, the Spanish executed Rizal in 1896.
Spain, concerned with the prospect of more uprisings, sent
an additional 4,000 soldiers to the Philippines, bringing
total troop strength up to 22,000.15
The same year Rizal was executed, Andreas Bonifacio
formed a secret society called the Katipunan.

Once

Spanish authorities discovered the existence of the
Katipunan, they acted quickly to prevent the movement from
spreading.

14
15

The police rounded up and imprisoned several

Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, pp. 32-33.
Karnow, In Our Image, p. 73.
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thousand suspected members of the Katipunan, torturing and
executing many of them.

In an effort to prevent the

destruction of the Katipunan, Bonifacio declared war on
Spain on August 29, 1896 and began the Philippine Revolt
by attacking an isolated Spanish garrison in Luzon.

One

of Bonifacio’s lieutenants, Emilio Aguinaldo, capably led
the rebellion in the province of Cavite, defeating a force
of 2,000 Spanish troops who were attempting to drive him
out of the province.16
Aguinaldo sought to capitalize on the emerging
nationalist spirit to unite the Filipinos against the
Spanish.

The result was that, in the face of Spanish

repression, the Katipuneros and the urban ilustrados
formed an alliance.

Real unity, however, was difficult to

achieve and required forceful measures.

As Stuart Miller

has written,

This alliance was actually the first real expression
of modern Filipino nationalism, one that, although
partially and temporarily, managed to transcend the
very sharp vertical divisions of class and the
formidable horizontal, ethnic ones. Passionate
ideological positions, however, kept the insurgency
divided.17

16
17

Karnow, In Our Image, p. 75.
Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, pp. 33-34.
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A power struggle between Bonifacio and Aguinaldo based on
religion, ideology, and personality exemplified this
division.

Aguinaldo, a Chinese mestizo, was an ilustrado

and the leader of the Cavite Katipunan.

Bonifacio was the

son of poor parents, and grew up in a Manila slum.
Aguinaldo eventually arrested Bonifacio and later executed
him.18

Aguinaldo consolidated power and emerged as the

undisputed leader of the revolt.
A year of fighting followed in Luzon, Panay, and
Negros.

However, by August 1897, Spanish forces

surrounded Aguinaldo’s poorly armed soldiers in their
stronghold in the mountains of Central Luzon.
Biac-na-Bato resolved the ensuing stalemate.

The Pact of
Under

provisions of the pact, Aguinaldo disavowed the rebellion
and declared his loyalty to Spain.

Additionally,

Aguinaldo and twenty-seven of his followers agreed to
deportation to Hong Kong.

In return, the Spanish promised

to pay Aguinaldo 800,000 pesos, institute reforms, and
liberalize its rule of the Philippines.
to honor the terms of the treaty.

Both sides failed

The Spanish did not

make any political reforms and paid less than half of the
money to the rebels, while Aguinaldo used the money he did
receive to buy guns and direct the rebellion from Hong
18

Ibid., p. 34.

13
Kong.

By March 1898, fighting resumed in the provinces in

Luzon, and quickly spread to the Visayan Islands.

CHAPTER 2

THE ARMY ON THE EVE OF WAR

Throughout its history, the United States Regular
Army had been engaged primarily in unconventional military
operations.

Although it failed to develop a formal

written doctrine to address such operations, soldiers and
officers passed the collective wisdom gained from years of
frontier service from one generation to the next, ensuring
that lessons learned, while not codified, were not
forgotten.

While this should have prepared the army well

for the Philippine Insurrection, America’s aversion to
maintaining a large, standing army meant that volunteers
would comprise the vast majority of the soldiers that
fought in the Philippines.

In fact, over 90 percent of

the initial forces sent to the Philippines were newly
raised Volunteer units, many of which had extremely
limited military experience.
The Army’s first effort at formal instruction in
unconventional warfare occurred at West Point in 1835,
when Dennis Hart Mahan first offered courses on small-unit

14

15
tactics and Indian warfare, based on lessons gleaned from
the previous one hundred years of warfare on the American
frontier.

Mahan taught the cadets to use friendly Indians

as scouts and to march deep into Indian territory to
destroy their food supplies and villages.1

These

techniques were eventually employed to end the Second
Seminole War (1835-1842).

The army initially established

a cordon of small posts to secure white settlements and
patrolled the surrounding countryside to limit the
Seminoles’ freedom of movement.

The conflict finally

ended when the army began campaigning in the summer,
attacking the Seminoles’ villages and destroying their
crops hidden deep in nearly impenetrable swampland.2
During the Mexican-American War, Major General
Winfield Scott would deal harshly with Mexican bandits,
denying them quarter and executing those accidentally
captured.

Scott also burned villages suspected of

harboring guerrillas.

However, his soldiers also

distributed food, cleaned streets, and maintained schools
and hospitals.

Such complementary measures were

remarkably similar to those implemented in the Philippines

1

Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and
Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860-1941 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1998), pp. 12-13.
2
Ibid., p. 10.
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fifty years later.

Ulysses S. Grant, one of Scott’s

subordinates, wondered if “the great majority of the
Mexican people did not regret our departure as much as
they had regretted our coming.”3
Likewise, many of the senior officers in the
Philippines learned first-hand effective techniques for
dealing with partisans and unruly civilians during the
Civil War.

The last commander of U.S. military forces in

the Philippines, Adna Chaffee, had been a subordinate of
General Philip Sheridan during the Shenandoah Valley
Campaign.

Chaffee helped put the torch to the Loudoun

Valley in 1864, in an effort to capture Colonel John S.
Mosby’s Partisan Rangers.4

Just as Chaffee learned from

Sheridan, Sheridan as a lieutenant had learned from
Colonel George Wright.

In a campaign against the Indians

in the Washington territory in 1858, Wright had applied
techniques he had learned during the Second Seminole War.5
While no written doctrine existed to capture lessons
learned, the army’s extensive knowledge gained fighting
unconventional wars or facing insurgents and irregulars in
the American Revolution, the Seminole Wars, the Mexican
American War, and the American Civil War was not lost.
3

Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 133.
5
Ibid., p. 11.
4

It

17
was “transmitted from one generation of soldiers to the
next through a combination of official and unofficial
writings, curricular materials, conversations, and
individual memories.”6
As important as the tactical lessons learned during
the Civil War was the development of General Orders 100,
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, originally signed by President
Abraham Lincoln on April 24, 1863.

The army published it

in response to the formation of the Partisan Regulars by
the Confederate Army in the spring of 1862.

The fact

that the Partisan Rangers were an official part of the
Confederate Army forced the North to reevaluate its
policy concerning irregular forces.
Dr. Francis Lieber, a noted legal scholar, wrote
Guerrilla Parties, which served as the basis for General
Orders 100.

In his pamphlet, Lieber divided irregular

forces into four categories:

the partisan, the

guerrilla, the war rebel, and the armed prowler (or
bushwhacker).

Lieber considered irregular forces

legitimate (i.e. partisans) if they were uniformed,
enrolled, paid, led by officers, and subordinate to a
proper military authority.
6

Ibid., pp. 5-6.

If an irregular force met

18
these conditions, they were “fully entitled to the laws
of war as long as they themselves did not violate them.”7
Guerrillas, as Lieber defined them, were not tied
directly to an army, and “carried on a petty war by
raids, extortion, destruction, and massacre.”8

These

guerrilla bands were especially dangerous and fell
outside the laws of war because “they could easily evade
pursuit by laying down their arms and become insidious
enemies.”9

Although for that reason, guerrillas could be

treated harshly, Lieber believed they should be afforded
the rights of prisoners of war until their crimes could
be proved.
The war rebel and the armed prowler were different
matters.

Lieber defined the war rebel as a civilian who

took up arms against an occupying power.

The armed

prowler, or bushwhacker, was a civilian who took it upon
himself to shoot sentinels.

Both wore civilian clothes

and hid among the local population.

Lieber considered

these irregulars to be bandits, and argued that the
occupying army should treat them according to their
crimes, whether or not they abided by the laws of war.

7

Ibid., pp. 32-33.
Ibid., p. 33.
9
Ibid.
8

19
Likewise, civilians who provided assistance and
information to the war rebel or armed prowler deserved
similarly harsh treatment.10
General Orders 100 proscribed the acts committed by
irregular bands, and allowed strict punishments such as
expulsion, relocation, imprisonment, fines, property
confiscation, and possible execution of those who aided
the enemy.

It also allowed for denying quarter to the

guerrillas who gave none or who disguised themselves as
civilians.11

Paragraphs 82-85 authorized the death penalty

for “murderers, highway robbers, persons destroying
property, spies, conspirators, and the part-time
guerrilla.”12

For the first time, the army officially

recognized the right of retaliation.
Despite the apparently harsh tone of General Orders
100, it also “admonished soldiers to respect the personal
and property rights of unarmed citizens, as well as their
religious and social customs.”

13

All forms of wanton

looting, pillaging, cruel acts, torture, and revenge were
strictly prohibited.

Lieber believed that a reciprocal

relationship existed between the occupying army and the

10

Ibid., p. 33.
Ibid., pp. 34-35.
12
John Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, CT: Yale
University Press, 1982) p. 191.
13
Birtle, U.S. Army, p. 34.
11
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civilians.

If the latter took up arms, supported

irregulars, or resisted the occupying army, they were
committing a crime and could expect harsh treatment from
the military.

Conversely, if they were compliant, the

army should show restraint and, under General Orders 100,
“treat civilians with justice and humanity.”14
After the Civil War, General Orders 100 became an
established principle of United States military law.

By

1875, the curriculum at the United States Military Academy
included classes on the provisions of General Orders 100.
Internationally, Prussia, France, and Great Britain
adopted it as well.

General Orders 100 served as the

foundation for the Hague Conventions in 1899 and 1907, the
first international agreements on the laws of war.
Lieber’s work officially became part of United States Army
doctrine in 1940, when the army incorporated it into Field
Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare.15
At the end of the Civil War, the United States Army
had an effective and widely accepted counterinsurgency
policy.

The army was also battle-hardened from four long

years of conflict and was arguably the most powerful

14

Brian MacAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), p. 9.
15
Birtle, U.S. Army, p. 35; Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags,
p. 191.
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military force in the world; however, rapid demobilization
changed that.

In 1866, Congress set the army’s authorized

strength at 54,000, but eight years later, reduced it to
just over 27,000 officers and men.

Desertion, sickness,

and discharges meant that on average, less than 20,000 men
were present for duty.

Congress exacerbated the personnel

problem in 1874 when it imposed a force reduction, but did
not reduce the total number of units in the army.

Most

infantry companies consisted of less than forty privates.16
The army remained roughly at that level of manning until
the outbreak of the Spanish-American War.17
The small size of the regular army meant that
promotions for officers were few and far between.

An

officer often was not promoted until his superior retired
or died.

In 1877, a lieutenant could expect to reach the

rank of major in twenty-five years, and colonel in thirtyfive years.18

The situation worsened to the point that by

1890, the average age of a first lieutenant was fortyfive, the average captain fifty years old.19

16

Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars, The United States
Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 (Lincoln, NE: University of
Nebraska Press, 1973), pp. 15-16.
17
Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, Department of
the Army Pamphlet 20-212, History of Military Mobilization in
the U.S. Army, 1774-1945 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1955), p. 141, pp. 149-150.
18
Utley, Frontier Regulars, p. 19.
19
Birtle, U.S. Army, p. 63.
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The reconstruction of the South following the Civil
War provided these officers with experiences that aided
them later in the military administration of the
Philippines.20

The district commanders in the South had to

deal with matters such as “horse stealing, moonshining,
rioting, civil court proceedings, regulating commercial
law, public education, fraud, removing public officials,
registering voters, [and] holding elections.”21

After

Reconstruction ended in 1877, the regular army’s primary
mission was the protection of settlers on the western
frontier from the Indians.

The widely dispersed white

settlements and Indian tribes required the army to
garrison numerous small outposts, a difficult mission for
a small force on the vast frontier, inhabited by over
270,000 Indians.

In one military division, there was only

one soldier for every one hundred square miles of
territory.22

Since regiments were spread over such an

expansive area, the army conducted few large-scale
operations or maneuvers.

By 1898, it could be said that

the United States did not have an army in the operational
sense of the word.
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collection of companies, battalions, regiments, and
batteries” scattered among eighty posts in the frontier.23
Despite all of these shortcomings, the regular army
would emerge from thirty years of nearly continuous
campaigning against the Indians well prepared to fight the
Philippine Insurrection.

Two specific conditions of the

Indian Campaigns provided invaluable experience directly
applicable in the Philippines.

First, the army fought an

enemy who was not clearly distinguishable from his
“kinsmen not disposed at the moment to be enemies.”24

Both

the American Indian and Filipino could “change with
bewildering rapidity from friend to foe to neutral, and
rarely could one be confidently distinguished from the
other.”25

Secondly, the army faced an enemy who employed

unconventional techniques, and who fought only on his own
terms.
Several other lessons learned by the aging
lieutenants and captains stationed in remote posts would
serve them well when they were rapidly promoted and placed
in charge of Regiments and Divisions in the Philippines.
As post or garrison commanders on the frontier, they had
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wrestled with the problem of whether to concentrate forces
in critical places or disperse them over wide areas.
Company and troop commanders developed innovative
techniques to increase their mobility in pursuit of
lightly burdened Indians by reducing their columns’
reliance on wagon and supply trains.

Forward-thinking

officers employed native scouts and formed native units to
track hostile Indians.

Finally, they recognized the

importance of separating the renegade Indians from their
villages and bases of supply.
Unfortunately, the sheer number of troops required
during the Philippine Insurrection meant that volunteers
and not the regular army would do most of the fighting.
The sudden outbreak of hostilities with Spain led Congress
to double the size of the Regular Army to over 58,000 men
and officers by the summer of 1898.

President McKinley’s

proclamation of April 23, 1898 called for 125,000
Volunteers to fight the Spanish-American War.

Dewey’s

surprise victory at Manila Bay opened a second front in
the war with Spain, and McKinley responded by calling for
an additional 75,000 Volunteers on May 25, 1898.

These

sudden increases in the size of the army left the Army

25
Quartermaster Department scrambling to equip, train, and
supply a force of a quarter of a million men.26
The army lacked stockpiles of arms, ammunition,
clothing, and supplies of all kinds.

In America’s first

major conflict to be fought outside the North American
continent, the country did not possess a single troopship,
and had no plans or preparations to move large groups of
soldiers by water.

Despite three years of rising tensions

with Spain, the army had failed to make mobilization
plans.

In fact, “there was no organization within the War

Department specifically responsible for mobilization
planning.”27
Supplying and equipping 200,000 volunteers was merely
the first problem the army faced.

The United States

lacked a pool of trained reserves or volunteers.

The

quality of the National Guard, as many state militias were
now called, varied considerably.

Although Congress had

doubled the amount of funding for firearms for the
militias in 1887, most units were still equipped with
single-shot, breech loading, black powder Springfield
rifles.28

While the regular army was generally well led,

trained and equipped, the roughly 100,000 National
26
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Guardsmen were poorly trained and disciplined and suffered
from indifferent leadership.29
The Guard had experienced the same problems as the
Regular Army with under-strength units.

However,

thousands of young men caught up in the wave of patriotism
sweeping America quickly filled the vacancies.

The result

was that, despite having experienced Guard units, the
Volunteers, who comprised the vast majority of the forces
serving in the Philippines, “were inexperienced and
untrained recruits.”30
The debate over the legality of the Guard serving
overseas also compounded problems.

Additionally, many

state militias also objected to serving under the control
of the Regular Army.

The Guard rejected an alternative

solution, which would have created federal volunteer units
with officers appointed by the President.31

The states and

the federal government reached a compromise when Congress
passed an act on April 22, 1898 creating the Volunteer
Army, in which soldiers could enlist for one year or the
duration of the War with Spain.

The Volunteer Army would

also consist of the state militias while in Federal
Service, meaning that, if the soldiers from a state unit
29
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volunteered en masse, they would be kept together as a
federal volunteer unit.

This “ensured that the Philippine

War would be fought with two distinct organizations,
Regulars and Volunteers.”32
A product of its experiences from the MexicanAmerican War, the Civil War, and the Indian Campaigns, the
regular army on the eve of the Spanish-American War was an
extremely experienced force, with an informal pacification
doctrine, based on the provisions of General Orders 100,
that sought to balance conciliation and repression.

Well

versed in small units tactics, and familiar with securing
local towns and villages, the officers understood the
importance of separating belligerents from noncombatants.
Officers had no qualms about dealing “the hard hand of
war” to those who continued to resist.33

The destruction

of crops and homes, imprisonment, expulsion, and death
were all proven techniques of dealing with unruly
opponents in Mexico, the American South, and on the
western frontier.
The army had evolved by combining the best elements
of the old world armies with those of the new world.
imposing “European style discipline, organization, and

By
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firepower” on small, mobile units capable of Indian style
raiding, the regular army was well equipped to fight
insurgents.34

Unfortunately, the majority of the regular

army initially deployed for combat in Cuba.

The

Volunteers heading to the Philippines would have to rely
on trial and error.
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CHAPTER 3

CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS AND BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION

With the nation focused on events in Cuba, the second
front that Dewey’s victory had opened in the Philippines
became an afterthought.

President McKinley and his

advisors devoted little time or thought to what to do with
the Philippines after victory over the Spanish, and gave
little guidance to military commanders.

McKinley’s

ignorance of the situation in the Philippines would cause
significant problems for his commanders attempting to
implement his policies, and would plunge the United States
into a costly four-year struggle.
The choice for commander of the Philippine Expedition
was Major General Wesley Merritt.

A graduate of West

Point in 1860, he had served with distinction in the Civil
War.

Cited six times for gallantry, Merritt was one of

the officers who accompanied General Ulysses S. Grant to
Appomattox.

Merritt was also a veteran of the Indian

campaigns, having served briefly with George Custer and

29
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under Philip Sheridan during the Ute campaign.

General

William Tecumseh Sherman recognized Merritt’s ability and
had lobbied for his promotion.1
Merritt requested a force of 14,400 men, half of whom
were to be regulars.

However, General Nelson A. Miles,

the Commanding General of the Army, disagreed, preferring
to send only two regular infantry regiments and 13,000 men
from the new Volunteer Regiments.2

Merritt quickly began

to train, drill, clothe, and equip the ragtag groups of
volunteers that descended on San Francisco.

Merritt’s

orderly formation and deployment of 8th Corps was a model
of efficiency.

Assisting him in that monumental endeavor

was his capable second in command, Elwell S. Otis.3
Prior to departing for the Philippines, Merritt
attempted to get more detailed instructions from President
McKinley in a meeting on May 12, 1898.

Still not clear

afterwards about his mission in the Philippines, the
general sent McKinley a letter on May 15, in which he
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astutely noted that “it seems more than probable that we
will have the so-called insurgents to fight as well as the
Spaniards.”

Merritt was also not sure if he was to

“subdue and hold all Spanish territory in the islands, or
merely to seize and hold the capital.”4

General Miles

confused the issue by issuing conflicting sets of orders
to Merritt.

In a May 14 directive, he ordered Merritt to

“occupy such part of the islands” as he was able to do
with the force available.

However, two days later, he

told Merritt that not to conquer extensive territory, but
simply establish “a strong garrison to command the harbor
of Manila.”5
McKinley helped little when he ordered Merritt to
“complete the reduction of Spanish power” and give “order
and security to the islands while in the possession of the
United States.”6

The President did not state whether or

not the possession of the Philippines would be permanent
or temporary, a decision he did not reach until October
25.7

McKinley also failed to give Merritt instructions as

to what relationship, if any, he was to have with the
4
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Filipino insurgents.8

McKinley’s failure to consider

seriously what impact the presence of Filipino
revolutionaries might have on Merritt’s mission would
haunt the United States for several years.
After his victory in Manila, Dewey realized that the
Filipino insurrection against the Spanish forces “was not
sufficiently developed to be advantageous to the
Americans in their war against Spain.”9

Dewey decided it

might be beneficial if Aguinaldo were present, so he
directed one of his ships to bring the rebel leader and
his staff from Hong Kong to the Philippines.

Aguinaldo

arrived on May 19, and immediately set about organizing
the revolutionary army and a government.
In the months preceding the outbreak of the SpanishAmerican war, the Spanish commander in the Philippines
had raised numerous Filipino militia regiments to help
defend against an American invasion.

When Aguinaldo now

issued his call to arms, approximately 10,000 Filipinos
from those units deserted to join him, accompanied by all
but one of their commanders.10
into two groups.

8
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of Liberation, while the Revolutionary Militia “consisted
of all [others] who wished to assist in the fight for
liberation.”11

Aguinaldo also divided each of the

Philippine provinces into zones, commanded by an officer
loyal to the jefe superior politico-militar of that
province.

In some cases, Aguinaldo merely conferred

military ranks to local chiefs, but he did send loyal
officers and experienced soldiers to each province to
ensure that his interests were represented.
With a force of 15,000 regulars, Aguinaldo laid
siege to the Spanish garrison defending Manila and began
to consolidate power in the provinces.

The Spanish

commander unwittingly aided Aguinaldo’s efforts by
dispersing his forces in small, isolated garrisons rather
than concentrating them at Manila.

The result was that

Aguinaldo’s units were able to capture these Spanish
outposts and surround Manila, the last major Spanish
garrison in Luzon.12
The first group of Merritt’s forces departed from San
Francisco on May 25, 1898 for the month-long voyage to the
Philippines.
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General Arthur MacArthur arrived in the Philippines on
July 31, landing near Pasay.

By this time, Aguinaldo had

declared himself dictator, issued the Philippine
Declaration of Independence, and proclaimed a
revolutionary government.

After the American forces had

disembarked, “a curiously triangular contest” resulted
among the besieged Spanish garrison in the Intramuros (the
old walled section of Manila), the insurgents under
Aguinaldo, and the American 8th Corps.13

Under orders not

to form alliances with the revolutionaries or to recognize
Aguinaldo’s government, Merritt faced the dilemma of how
to defeat the Spanish without provoking an open conflict
with the insurgents.

McKinley’s “failure to define

political objectives created complex difficulties for the
generals in command in Manila.”14
The solution Merritt arrived at was a secret
agreement with the commander of the Spanish garrison in
Manila.

A carefully choreographed attack would take place

with enough blood shed to satisfy Spanish honor and avoid
a court-martial for the Spanish commander.15

The Americans

convinced Aguinaldo to keep his forces outside the city,
supposedly to prevent the Filipinos from looting Manila
13

Linn, The Philippine War, p. 23.
Cosmas, An Army for Empire, p. 113.
15
Linn, The Philippine War, p. 24.
14

35
and carrying out retributions against the Spanish.
Aguinaldo also moved a portion of his forces aside,
clearing the way for the Americans to attack.

The battle

for Manila took place on August 13, 1898.
Merritt’s troops quickly defeated the Spanish, and
secured Manila with a loss of seventeen Americans killed
and 105 wounded.

Everything had gone almost in accordance

with the pre-arranged plan; however, to keep secrecy not
all of the commanders informed their subordinates about
the agreement between Merritt and his Spanish counterpart.
On one American warship, the gunners realized they had
received erroneous firing data, made corrections and
scored several direct hits on Manila.16

Ironically,

President McKinley had signed the armistice with Spain the
previous day.
The Americans now found themselves in the same
position as the Spanish garrison they had just defeated surrounded by Aguinaldo’s insurgents, who still occupied
their trenches around the city.

Merritt, his initial

mission successful, departed from the Philippines at the
end of August 1898.

Despite having spent less than a

month in the islands, Merritt would help determine the
fate of the Philippines at the Paris Peace Conference.
16
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Merritt’s successor, Major General Elwell S. Otis,
assumed command on August 29, 1898.

Like Merritt, he was

a veteran of the Civil War and the Indian Campaigns, most
notably against the Sioux.

Otis had served with Nelson A.

Miles during the pursuit of Sitting Bull after George
Armstrong Custer’s defeat at Little Big Horn, and had
founded the army’s staff school at Fort Leavenworth.17
Otis initially would lead the fight against the insurgents
and shape the U.S. counterinsurgency policy in the
Philippines.

Early on, he “recognized the importance of

civil as well as military policies.”18

While every one of

Otis’ campaigns was successful, and his forces were never
defeated in battle, he relied too heavily on civic actions
and failed to end the insurrection.
Otis was an extremely capable administrator and his
first step was to establish a military government in
Manila.

He also directed a clean-up of the city, which

was in squalor after six weeks of siege.

The population

of Manila had swelled to seven times its normal size and
the revolutionaries had cut off the city’s water supply.
The schools and the courts in Manila had been closed, and
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“rubbish and garbage, accumulated during the siege, lay
strewn about the city.”19
Otis’ clean-up of Manila not only dramatically
improved the living conditions for his soldiers; it made
Manila a symbol of “the benefits of American rule.”20

To

restore order, he established a provost guard force of
3,000 soldiers, along with a criminal court system.

The

Americans quintupled the number of open schools and
rebuilt or repaired roads and bridges.

Sanitation quickly

improved as soldiers supervised the removal of trash, set
up health clinics, and revamped the city’s lighting and
water systems.

Inspectors checked “dwellings, markets,

slaughterhouses, drugstores, and any other establishment
that could possibly affect the health of the community.”21
Health officials averted a smallpox epidemic by
vaccinating over 80,000 people.

To further insure the

health of the soldiers, “doctors inspected known
prostitutes weekly, and issued certificates of good health
to those found free of disease.”22

Many Volunteer

soldiers, only a few months removed from their civilian
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jobs, found themselves resuming their old occupations as
accountants, clerks, and schoolteachers.23
While civic actions in Manila occupied the Americans’
attention, Aguinaldo was busy deploying his troops and
seizing territory in Luzon.

By September 7, Otis was

reporting that Aguinaldo had “captured all Spanish
garrisons in Luzon.”24

Aguinaldo reorganized the Army of

Liberation along European lines, giving each conventional
unit a nomenclature and organization.

The Filipino

infantry was tough and hardy, requiring few supplies, and
had demonstrated its competence by easily defeating
Spanish garrisons.

However, it was relatively poorly

trained, the officer corps was weak, and lacked sufficient
quantities of weapons.25
Aguinaldo also created a formal government, with a
constitution and an elected assembly.

On September 15,

1898, the assembly elected him president.

He established

his capital in Malolos, twenty-five miles northeast of
Manila.

Otis now faced a delicate situation.

He was

still surrounded by Aguinaldo’s forces outside Manila, but
could not negotiate with them since the United States did
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not recognize Aguinaldo’s government.

Otis was still

operating under the guidance that Merritt had received,
which was that “the insurgents and all others must
recognize the military occupation and authority of the
United States.”26

Otis requested more detailed

instructions from Washington in a telegram on September
12, 1898.

Still wishing to avoid open confrontation with

the insurgents, he was clearly becoming concerned about
the growing strength of Aguinaldo’s forces, now estimated
at 30,000.

The Filipinos had acquired several thousand

rifles and rounds of ammunition from captured Spanish
forces and from Chinese smugglers.27 In fact, many of
Aguinaldo’s troops were better armed than their American
counterparts.

The .28 caliber Spanish Mausers had much

better long-range accuracy than the Springfield rifles
issued to the volunteer units.

Fortunately for the

Americans, the Filipinos turned out to be incredibly poor
marksmen.28
American and Spanish delegates signed the Treaty of
Paris on December 10, 1898 officially ending the Spanish26
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American War.

Spain gave up sovereignty over Cuba, which

became an independent state, and ceded Guam and Puerto
Rico to the United States.

America agreed to pay the

Spanish $20 million for the Philippines.
Now that the future of the Philippines was
ascertained, McKinley finally responded to Otis’ request
for guidance on December 21, 1898 with what became known
as the benevolent assimilation proclamation.

In his

proclamation, McKinley announced that “the future control,
disposition, and government of the Philippine Islands are
ceded to the United States” and the military government of
Manila “is to be dispatched to the whole of the ceded
territory.”29

Otis edited McKinley’s original

proclamation, toning down the language by deleting
references to American sovereignty, and issued it in the
Philippines on January 4, 1899.30

Brigadier General

Miller, however, had sent the original version to the
residents of Iloilo the previous day.

The original

eventually reached Aguinaldo, who at once realized the
United States did not intend to create an independent
Philippine state.
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McKinley’s proclamation showed how out of touch he
was with the true situation in the Philippines.31

He

ignored the fact that the Americans controlled only the
city of Manila, while Aguinaldo and his forces now
controlled virtually the rest of the Philippines.
McKinley thus had placed Otis in an impossible situation.
He expected Otis to tell Aguinaldo, in a manner that would
not provoke a fight, that American sovereignty of the
islands had been already decided.

Otis sent commissioners

to meet with Aguinaldo on January 11, but they resolved
nothing because “the Americans could not recognize the
Filipino government and the Filipinos would not recognize
American sovereignty.”32
Tensions, which had been rising between the Americans
and Filipinos for several months, increased and
negotiations broke down.

Hostilities erupted when Private

William Grayson from Nebraska fired on an insurgent patrol
on the night of February 4.

The Filipinos returned fire,

and the ensuing skirmish spread along the American lines
as other Filipino patrols, real and imagined, made contact
with the nervous Americans.

The following morning, 8th

Corps, led by Arthur MacArthur’s 2nd Division, attacked
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and routed the insurgent forces in the largest battle of
the war.33
Otis now turned his attention from civic policies to
concentrate on planning and executing military operations
against Aguinaldo’s forces.

Otis no doubt believed that

he could end the war quickly by capturing any one of three
strategic targets:

Aguinaldo himself, the revolutionary

capital at Malolos, or the Philippine Army.
objectives were located north of Manila.

All of these

MacArthur began

to advance north along the rail lines in an attempt to
trap the insurgents at Malolos.

He took the rebel capital

of Malolos in March, but the bulk of the Army of
Liberation managed to escape.

Aguinaldo’s forces had

learned to dig “get away” trenches, up to a half-mile
long, at the rear of their lines, which allowed them to
escape before the Americans stormed their fortifications.34
While MacArthur advanced north, Otis sent a brigade
of Regulars under Brigadier General Lloyd Wheaton south
from Manila to secure the Pasig River, which effectively
severed the rebels’ lines of communications between north
and south Luzon.35
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General Lawton secured Santa Cruz, while other units
captured Tagbilaran (the capital of Bohol), and the port
cities of Iloilo, Cebu, Bacolod, and Jolo.

All of these

victories required garrisons to prevent the guerrillas
from reclaiming the towns.
Despite the relatively easy victories, Otis was
cautious and feared that his lines would become over
extended.

Of the 20,000 troops at his disposal, 3000

served in Manila as the provost guard, while 15,000 were
Volunteers eligible for discharge once the War with Spain
ended on February 14.36

Although Otis was receiving

additional forces from the United States, they did little
more than replace the thousands of homeward bound
Volunteers.37
The good news was that the replacement troops were
the newly created U.S. Volunteer Regiments.

Trained and

equipped in the States before deployment, and generally
led by high-quality officers, these regiments would serve
with distinction in combat as well as in pacification and
counter-guerrilla operations.38

Brigadier General Samuel

B.M. Young wrote that the new volunteer units were “a
better body of volunteer soldiers than I have seen during
36
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my service of nearly forty years.”39

Otis also formed two

additional Volunteer Regiments with officers and men from
the volunteers who chose to remain in the Philippines
after their enlistments had expired.
On April 29, 1899, Otis met with Florentino Torres,
a representative from Aguinaldo, who requested a
cessation of hostilities for three weeks in order to
allow the Filipino Congress to “decide whether to
continue prosecution of the war or propose terms of
peace.”40

Otis rejected the offer and insisted on

unconditional surrender, with full amnesty.

By declining

the truce, “Otis committed the Americans to a military
solution” despite the fact that he lacked the ability to
achieve it.41

At a time when he wanted to keep pressure

on Aguinaldo, Otis did not have sufficient forces to do
so.

Furthermore, the start of the rainy season at the

end of May precluded even limited offensive operations.
Since American troop strength did not permit control
of the entire archipelago, Otis continued to focus his
efforts on conventional attacks on Aguinaldo’s forces.
Insufficient manpower forced the Americans to abandon
39
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many of the towns they had conquered in order to maintain
pursuit of the insurgents.

In fact, in August 1899, Otis

was unable to campaign on the islands of Panay and Cebu
due to lack of troops.42

As soon as the Americans left an

area, Aguinaldo’s forces would reoccupy it and punish any
inhabitants who had supported the Americans.

Otis summed

up his frustrations in his annual report that same
August:

Little difficulty attends the act of taking
possession and temporarily holding any section of
the country. A column of 3,000 men could march
though and successfully contend with any force which
the insurgents could place in its route, but they
would close in behind it and again prey upon the
inhabitants. 43

The fact was that he could win battles or hold territory,
but not both.

Otis was partly to blame for his lack of

manpower because he consistently provided Washington with
“rosy reports of progress,” thus undermining the
legitimacy of his requests for more troops.44
Another challenge Otis faced was that he not only
had to defeat the revolutionaries decisively, but also
42
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had to do so in a manner that would facilitate permanent
pacification in the future.

Implied in this task was the

requirement to establish a colonial government based on
the idea of benevolent assimilation as outlined by
President McKinley.

In mid-1899, therefore, Otis issued

orders to establish municipal governments in occupied
towns.45

The man who developed the general plan for

implementing that order was Colonel William A. Kobbé,
regarded by many as the most capable American officer in
the Philippines.

Kobbé’s plan called for a

representative municipal council to elect a president
(mayor) to serve for one year.

The president would be

responsible for establishing a police force, collecting
taxes, enforcing sanitary measures, and opening schools.46
The entire army soon adopted the model Kobbé developed
for use in the whole archipelago.
Two of the commanders charged with attempting to
implement the policy of benevolent assimilation were
Brigadier General James F. Smith and Marcus Miller.

Otis

appointed Smith as the military governor of the subdistrict of the Negroes, in the Visayan Military
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District.

A Catholic lawyer and an experienced

politician, Smith set out to make the Negroes a model of
American rule.

He raised a local 200-man constabulary

that, in addition to its police functions, served as
guides for the Americans.

By August 1899, the force had

been renamed the Battalion of Native Reserves and went on
to became one of “the most successful scout-police forces
the U.S. Army raised, without a single deserter or lost
rifle in its entire existence.”47
Miller had occupied Iloilo on February 11 and
immediately issued a proclamation that established a
military government with local officials maintaining
their posts, except when evidence of misconduct was
present.

Miller also promised to respect the

inhabitants’ private property and religious beliefs.
After opening the port of Iloilo for trade, Miller issued
a second proclamation declaring that, “the Americans have
not come to the island of Panay as conquerors or
invaders, but as friends to protect all Filipinos in
their homes, in their employment, and in their personal
and religious rights.”48

Unfortunately, Miller had only

enough troops to secure the area around the city of

47
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Iloilo, while the insurgents controlled the rest of the
island of Panay.
Miller’s replacement, Brigadier General Robert P.
Hughes, shaped “the American pacification campaign in the
central Philippines” more than any other officer did.49
Hughes quickly began to control the movement of food out
of the city of Iloilo in attempt to deprive the
guerrillas of support from sympathizers in the city.
People who lived outside the city were allowed a daily
ration for their families.

Delgado, the insurgent

commander on Panay, responded by imposing his own
blockade; his plan backfired however, and the population
in the American-controlled area more than doubled.50
After the rainy season ended in the fall of 1899,
Otis resumed his conventional offensive operations with a
three-pronged drive in north central Luzon, designed to
trap the elusive Army of Liberation.

General Lawton

attacked in the east, recaptured San Isidro, and then
continued to San Fabian on the Lingayen Gulf.

General

MacArthur followed the rail line on the western side of
Luzon, seized Tarlac, and then marched to Dagupan.
General Lloyd Wheaton moved by ship and captured San
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Jacinto.

To complete the grand maneuver, Wheaton then

moved his forces to Dagupan in order to serve as a
blocking force for MacArthur.51

The operation began well,

but soon bogged down as the rough terrain, hot climate,
and resupply problems slowed the American advance.

Some

units reported as many as 50 percent of their men unable
to move due to sickness or exhaustion.

The tortuous

pursuit of Aguinaldo nonetheless continued throughout
October and November, and eventually left the Army of
Liberation broken “into small bands scattered through
these provinces.”52

Aguinaldo and a number of his

followers managed to escape, but Otis had accomplished
his goal.

The Filipino army had ceased to exist as a

regular fighting force.53
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CHAPTER 4

A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR

Otis departed the Philippines on May 6, 1900
convinced that the policy of benevolent assimilation,
civic actions, and conventional military operations had
won the war.

He had always underestimated the magnitude

of the rebellion and overestimated the appeal of
benevolent assimilation, however, and failed to detect
Aguinaldo’s shift to guerrilla war, preferring to believe
that the Army of Liberation had disintegrated.

General

Arthur MacArthur, Otis’ successor, eventually realized
that the insurrection was far from over, and that
defeating Aguinaldo would require sterner measures.
Throughout his first six months in command, MacArthur
continued the policies of benevolent assimilation and the
civic programs instituted by Otis.

Facing increasing

guerrilla activity and pressure from his subordinates,
MacArthur implemented a tougher pacification policy in
December 1900, based on the provisions of General Orders
100.

This new policy, combined with coordinated military

50

51
operations, successfully weakened or ended the insurgency
in most areas of the Philippines.
After their inability to defeat the Americans in
conventional battles during the first few months of 1899,
several of Aguinaldo’s followers realized that a new
strategy might be in order.

As early as March 1899,

General Antonio Luna had come out in favor of adopting a
strategy of guerrilla warfare in order to harass the
Americans until they abandoned the islands.

Other

guerrilla leaders voiced similar sentiments to Aguinaldo
as their forces suffered defeats at the hands of the
Americans.1
Aguinaldo remained unconvinced until November 13,
after Otis’ offensive effectively destroyed the Army of
Liberation’s ability to fight as an organized force.
Belatedly acknowledging the futility of engaging the
Americans in set-piece battles, Aguinaldo officially
changed his strategy to guerrilla warfare.

Despite the

fact that Otis had predicted a guerrilla war months
earlier, he did not notice Aguinaldo’s change of
strategy.

Assuming that the U.S. forces were close to

victory and the revolutionaries were near defeat, Otis

1
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continued to wage a conventional campaign during the
first half of 1900 designed to “extend American authority
as rapidly as possible.”2
Aguinaldo reorganized the Philippine Army of
Liberation to fit his new strategy of guerrilla warfare
directing his forces to switch from large battalions to
smaller, more mobile units.

To control these units, he

divided the Philippine Islands into guerrilla districts,
provinces, zones, and sub-zones.

A general officer

commanded a district; colonels, the provinces; lieutenant
colonels, zones; and Majors, sub-zones.3
Aguinaldo instructed his subordinates to fight only
when they had a numerical advantage over the Americans.
He did that partly to preserve the insurgents’ dwindling
supply of arms and ammunition – a testimony to the
growing effectiveness of the American naval blockade.
The main reason Aguinaldo told his forces to avoid
decisive battle, however, was because his primary
objective was no longer the military defeat of the United
States Army.

Instead, he hoped to weaken America’s will

to fight by prolonging the struggle.
2
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Aguinaldo was aware of a growing anti-imperialist
movement in America.

The year 1900 was a presidential

election year, and William Jennings Bryan was running on
an anti-imperialist platform against President McKinley.
Aguinaldo encouraged his subordinates to increase their
efforts, hoping to influence the outcome of the election.
A victory by Bryan in November, he thought, could mean an
American withdrawal from the Philippines.

In the six-

month period following the defeat of the Army of
Liberation, American casualties increased over 40
percent.4
The tactics used by the insurgents included
ambushing American supply columns and attacking sentries
with bolos (long knives similar to a machete, easily
concealed under clothing).

American patrols encountered

traps consisting of concealed pits filled with sharpened
stakes, or bows and arrows triggered by tripwires strung
across a path.

The guerrillas also tore down telegraph

lines and ambushed the parties sent to repair them.5

One

such engagement on September 22, 1900 was typical of this
new type of war.

First Lieutenant Alfred Aloe, Commander

of Company E, 12th U.S. Infantry Regiment, led a thirty-

4

Ibid., p. 171.
Ibid., p. 159.

5

54
three-man detachment to repair a telegraph wire that had
been cut by the insurgents.

As the American troops

approached, an estimated 500 insurgents opened fire at
ranges from five to one hundred yards.

The fighting

raged for four and one-half hours, until a platoon of
reinforcements arrived from the nearby garrison and
forced the insurgents to flee.6
Both Aguinaldo and the Americans realized that the
success of this new guerrilla war depended on the support
of the Filipino people.

The insurgents relied on the

villagers for food, money, shelter, recruits, and
information.

The insurgents also hid among the people,

playing the role of a friendly amigo as the American
patrols passed through the villages.

The Americans

captured several guerrillas wearing civilian clothes
underneath their military uniforms.

Through his field

glasses, one officer observed a Filipino change from
insurgent to amigo: “He has shed all signs of the
soldier, grabbed a white flag and some agricultural tool
and gone to work, hard, in the nearest field, and shouted
‘viva America’ when the hot American soldier again hove

6
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into sight.”7

Two companies from the 15th Infantry

Regiment had a similar experience on September 17, 1900.
After pursuing a force of 800 guerrillas, waist-deep
water forced the Americans to halt.

The Americans

retired for the evening after trading shots with the
insurgents for over an hour.

The next morning the

Americans discovered that the insurgents had escaped,
“most of them no doubt going back into contiguous barrios
to appear for the time being, or until called to fight
again, as peaceful amigos.”8

General Young, commander of

the 1st District, Department of Northern Luzon, summed up
the frustrations experienced by most U.S. commanders
fighting the guerrillas in a letter to Theodore Roosevelt
two months later:

To pursue a force of 200 or 300, more or less,
into a jungle where my troops have to slash the growth
to get through and keep together for self-protection,
and then to emerge and find nothing but peasants
scantily clad and hard at work harvesting rice –
apparently innocent and knowing nothing whatever of
any insurgents – is discouraging.9
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To insure continued support from the villagers, the
insurgents waged a propaganda campaign, spreading rumors
and exaggerating American crimes of rape, looting, and
murder.

The guerrillas also magnified reports of

American casualties and defeats.

At one point, they even

claimed to have captured General MacArthur.

Aguinaldo

attempted to keep the Filipinos’ spirits high by
appealing to patriotism, nationalism, and hopes of
foreign intervention in the conflict.

However, his

agents working to secure assistance from Japan failed,
and assistance from Germany and other European powers
never materialized.10
In areas where support for the rebellion had never
been very strong, the insurgents were forced to rely on
terror to assure support from the populace.

By the

middle of 1900, “a full scale campaign of terrorism had
begun, and terror became the primary weapon of the
revolutionaries.”11

The insurgents fined or beat people

guilty of minor offenses against the revolution.
severe penalties included having one’s property
confiscated, house burned, being buried alive, or
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decapitation.12

The insurgents murdered local municipal

officials put in place by the Americans as a warning to
other Americanistas.

The fear of reprisals obviously

undermined the United States effort to establish
municipal governments.

Since the Americans lacked the

manpower necessary to garrison every village, the
insurgents would merely reoccupy the town after the U.S.
troops had left, and punish anyone suspected of having
helped them.13
The Filipinos had reason to fear the insurgents.

By

the end of 1900, there had been 350 assassinations and
442 assaults recorded by the Americans.14

The insurgents’

strategy initially worked; by setting fire to occupied
towns and assassinating local officials who collaborated
with the Americans, the guerrillas received grudging
support from the people.

However, these practices were

destined to fail in the long run.

Major General

Pantaleon Garcia, Aguinaldo’s Chief of Staff, realized
that “if we do not endeavor to gain the goodwill of the
people our efforts will have been in vain.”15

By relying

on terror and extortion to gain support, intelligence,
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and supplies from the Filipino people, the insurgents
actually drove many Filipinos closer to the Americans.
This was especially true in occupied towns where the
interaction between the Filipinos and the Americans
convinced many locals of the benevolent purposes of the
Americans.

Unfortunately, even with 60,000 troops

occupying over 400 garrisons, the Americans could not
protect the entire population of the Philippines.
Major A.L. Dade summed up the difficult position of
the Filipino people, who very reasonably feared “the
vengeance of the insurgents, who do not hesitate to
murder or torture them for any suspected leanings towards
us.”

The Filipinos naturally worried more about the

insurgents than “any punishment that we are likely to
inflict upon them for failure to be actively or passively
friendly.”16

Villagers would not support the Americans

until they had protection from the insurgents, and the
penalty for not helping the Americans was as severe as
the penalty imposed by the insurgents.
As American frustrations mounted, it was clear to
many officers that a change of policy was necessary.
However, MacArthur failed to provide new guidance to his
subordinates until December 19, 1900, long after many had
16
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implemented their own policies.

Throughout 1900, several

officers had responded to the rise of insurgent terrorist
tactics with their own calculated acts of violence and
brutality.

The Americans burned barrios adjacent to

places where ambushes or acts of sabotage had occurred.
The use of the “water cure” increased after the middle of
1900, as soldiers attempted to gain intelligence on the
whereabouts of the insurgents.17
General Lloyd Wheaton was one officer who adopted
sterner pacification measures long before MacArthur
officially sanctioned them.

Wheaton assumed command of

the Department of Northern Luzon on April 19, 1900.

While

he publicly supported the official policy of benevolent
assimilation, privately Wheaton expressed doubt.

“You

can’t put down a rebellion,” he wrote, “by throwing
confetti and sprinkling perfumery.”18

Wheaton did promote

a few civic programs - his troops constructed of more than
1,000 miles of roads - but in one of his first orders, he
directed his subordinates to arrest, imprison, or deport
anyone who aided the insurgents.

Convinced that “the

solution to guerrilla warfare was aggressive military
17
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operations,”19 he continuously maneuvered his 25,000
soldiers around the department in an attempt to control
over two million inhabitants.

Mounted infantry, led by

local guides, pursued the guerrillas for weeks at a time.
Telesforo Carrasco, a local insurgent leader, wrote in his
diary that his units were unable to rest because the
Americans ambushed them during movement, both day and
night.

Furthermore, the Americans drove his units out of

supply depots and towns, burned their supporters’ homes,
and destroyed their crops.

After a few months, Carrasco’s

company simply ceased to exist.20

A combination of forced

resettlement, crop destruction, and active military
operations allowed Wheaton to pacify the department by the
middle of May 1901.
In 1900, one of Wheaton’s subordinates, Brigadier
James M. Bell, Commander of the 3rd District, Department
of Southern Luzon, implemented his own counterinsurgency
policies in an effort to pacify his sector on the Bicol
peninsula.

Major General Vito Belarmino, the insurgent

leader, initially attempted to oppose American landings
in January 1900.

After his forces suffered heavy losses,

he retreated to the interior, and ordered all civilians
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to leave the occupied towns.

His strategy initially

worked; however, it proved impossible to feed the
insurgents and the people living in the hills.

The

American naval blockade and destruction of crops and
storehouses also decreased the supply of food to the
insurgents.

As more and more civilians returned to the

occupied towns, Belarmino was forced to collect food by
levying sanctions against the people in the villages.
This caused a backlash against the insurgents and the
towns eventually became “centers of pro-American
sentiment.”21
Bell had only 2,600 soldiers under his command to
control 5,600 square miles of territory and a population
of over 600,000 people.

While his troops could garrison

the major towns, they were unable to make the enemy stand
and fight.

After a few abortive attacks against

garrisoned towns, Belarmino’s guerrillas were content to
snipe at supply columns and patrols, and build booby
traps and snares.

The first half of 1900 was thus

largely a stalemate, with the Americans controlling the
towns, and the insurgents free to roam the interior.
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Neither side was able to inflict a decisive defeat on the
other.22
Lacking troop strength, Bell and his staff realized
that new counterinsurgency policies were necessary in
order to isolate the guerrillas from the local
population.

Dissatisfied with Kobbé’s model for

municipal government, Bell developed his own plan, in
which the garrison commander and the town mayor created a
town council and a local police force.

By providing

security, business contracts, and a great deal of
autonomy, the Americans ensured the loyalty of the
mayors.

When the insurgents attempted to kill local

officials, it only served to drive the people closer to
the Americans.

One town mayor even formed his own

militia, which raided insurgent supply depots.

Local

police identified guerrillas hiding in the towns and, in
some areas, conducted joint patrols with the army.
Several post commanders had armed the police and
auxiliaries with whatever weapons they had available.
Through persistent nagging, Bell eventually overcame
MacArthur’s reluctance to arm the Filipinos and in
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February 1901, created the Bicol Scouts, a military unit
composed of native Filipinos.23
In addition to the creation of municipal governments
and police forces in occupied towns, Bell implemented
other civic programs.

By October 1900, every occupied

town had a school, and by March 1901, the Camarines
province had fifty schools with 12,000 students.24
Additionally, army doctors provided medical care to the
local civilians.
To complete the isolation of the insurgents from the
townspeople, Bell imposed travel restrictions.

Anyone

traveling outside a village required a pass from the post
commander.

Additionally, commanders restricted the

amount of food leaving towns or required an armed escort
to accompany to food.

One commander directed that all

rice be stored inside the towns, while patrols destroyed
food and crops found in the hillsides.

By August 1900,

Bell’s policies had forced Belarmino’s guerrillas to
curtail military operations in order to search for food.
With the towns now secure, Bell sent out numerous small
patrols to pursue the insurgents.

Over the next several

months, the combination of relentless military pressure
23
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and a lack of food forced over 1,200 guerrillas to
surrender between January and March 1901.

In May, a

final three-week campaign brought the death or capture of
another 1,050 guerrillas and Belarmino finally
surrendered to the Americans on July 4.25
Another of Wheaton’s subordinates, Brigadier General
Samuel B.M. Young, Commander of the 1st District,
Department of Northern Luzon, initially supported civic
action and the policy of benevolent assimilation.

By June

1900, his forces had established 203 schools with an
enrollment of 10,714 students.

Young expected the

enrollment to more than double to over 25,000 the
following year, encompassing more than half of all the
school-age children in his district.26

He also established

municipal governments, held elections, and built roads to
demonstrate the value of benevolent American rule.

As

guerrilla attacks increased in his district, Young
countered by applying “the remedial measures that proved
so effective with the Apaches.”27
Guerrilla leaders Manuel Tinio and Juan Villamor
opposed Young in northern Luzon.
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Dade wrote a report about a captured document issued by
Tinio.

Under penalty of death, Tinio required local

presidents, civil authorities, and barrio leaders to
report immediately to the insurgents the movement,
direction, plan, and number of the enemy.

Those who told

the Americans the location of insurgent camps, stopping
places, or insurgent movements were subject to be put to
death, regardless of their sex and age.

Finally, it was

punishable by death to act voluntarily as a guide for the
Americans, unless it was to lead them in the wrong
direction.28
In the fall of 1900, Young’s department was the scene
of some of the heaviest fighting in the Philippines as
Tinio and Villamor launched an offensive attempting to
influence the American presidential election.

Young, “his

patrols ambushed, supply lines raided, his communications
destroyed, and his contacts among the population kidnapped
and killed,” retaliated.29

He restricted all civilian

travel, moved people living in rural areas into protected
zones, destroyed crops, confiscated property, and burned
homes of insurgent sympathizers.

Young also dispatched

columns to sweep the mountains, destroying insurgent
28
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supplies and forcing them to scatter.

His campaign was

successful, and Villamor surrendered on April 29, 1901,
followed in May by Tinio.30
At the end of 1900, MacArthur finally issued a
comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, months after
Wheaton, Bell, Young, and numerous others had developed
and executed their own.

In response to requests from his

subordinates to implement more effective policies to
counter the insurgents’ fall offensive and their
increasing violations of established laws of war,
MacArthur declared martial law and directed the use of
more stringent pacification measures.

MacArthur based

these new severe measures on General Orders 100.
Experiences with the guerrillas in 1900 convinced
MacArthur that the “most important maxim of Filipino
tactics was to disband when closely pressed and seek
safety in the nearest barrio.”31

He also concluded that

the major reason the insurgents were able to continue
their resistance was because they controlled the towns and
villages.

MacArthur believed that pacification would only

occur once the Americans isolated the guerrilla from his
civilian base, thereby depriving them of supplies,
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information, and refuge.32

MacArthur, therefore, targeted

not only the insurgents, but also those civilians who
aided them.

In his proclamation to the Filipinos on

December 20, 1900, MacArthur made it clear to the people
living in occupied areas that, if they aided the
insurgents, they would be considered “war rebels, or war
traitors, according to the nature of their overt acts,”
and would be punished by the army.33

Furthermore,

MacArthur put the insurgents on notice that, if they
failed to follow established laws of war, they would be
denied the previously lenient treatment they had received
as prisoners of war.

Earlier, MacArthur had commuted

death sentences and turned disarmed rebels loose after
they took an oath not to take up arms against the
Americans.

But now, invoking Francis Lieber’s definition

of guerrillas, MacArthur decreed that

men who participate in hostilities without being part
of a regular organized force, and without sharing
continuously in its operations, but who do so with
intermittent returns to their homes and vocations,
divest themselves of the character of soldiers and if
captured are not entitled to privileges of prisoners
of war.34
32
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MacArthur timed the implementation of his new
policies perfectly.

Insurgent morale had hit an all time

low after news of Bryan’s defeat in the presidential
election reached the Philippines.

At the end of 1900,

U.S. troop levels reached 70,000, the highest of the war.
In conjunction with the dry season offensive, MacArthur
hoped to “isolate the guerrilla from his civilian base” by
applying General Orders 100.35

To deny the insurgents

access to the villages, MacArthur used the additional
troops to man a total of 502 garrisons.

In areas where

commanders lacked sufficient troops to guard the villages,
MacArthur supported the concept of concentrating the
people into towns they could secure.
Another important development that greatly aided the
Americans in their fight against the insurgents was the
creation of the Division of Military Information in Manila
on December 13, 1900.

The division’s primary mission was

the collection and dissemination of military
intelligence.36

This division pored over numerous captured

documents, gleaning valuable information as to what the
guerrillas were doing and planning.

In the field, some

officers had succeeded in determining how the insurgents
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established shadow governments in towns controlled by the
Americans and even used occupied towns as bases for their
activities.37

The Division of Military Information was

able to collect this information from one area and provide
it to commanders all over the Philippines.

This new unit

also compiled lists and photographs of known rebel
sympathizers, which helped identify and dismantle the
insurgent supply network in many areas.38
The creation of local police forces and military
units composed of native Filipinos increased after
December 1900 as well.

The most famous was the Macabebe

Scouts, created in 1899 under the command of Captain
Matthew Batson.

The Macabebes were long-time enemies of

the Tagalogs, and the army was quick to capitalize on this
animosity.

In some cases, the mere threat of using the

Macabebes was enough to restore order.

From January to

June 1901, the number of Filipinos serving in military
units increased from 1,402 to over 5,400.

Additionally,

over 6,000 Filipinos served as police officers.39

The

police provided invaluable assistance by identifying
insurgents and their sympathizers hiding in the villages.
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The growth of the Filipino Federal Party demonstrated
the weakening influence of the revolutionaries over the
Filipino upper classes, whose support had been so very
critical to the movement.

Between January and June of

1900, 250 Federal party committees appeared, and by June
1901 the party claimed a membership of over 150,000
people.

William Howard Taft, head of the Second

Philippine Commission, wrote that it was “spreading like
wildfire throughout the islands.”

After the war,

insurgent General José Alejandrino acknowledged, “that the
campaign of the Federal Party [had] subtracted men and
resources almost daily from the revolutionary cause.”40
In retrospect, it appears that MacArthur’s new
strategy caused a rapid breakdown of the insurgency;
however, signs of the insurrection’s imminent collapse
were already present.

Aguinaldo denounced MacArthur’s

policies on January 17, 1901, and exhorted his men to
capture more Americans to trade for imprisoned Filipinos.
However, it was too late.

Relentless military pursuit

denied the guerrillas sanctuary in the interior areas.
The widespread destruction of food and crops outside the
villages starved the insurgents.

The more stringent

pacification policies and the increased number of American
40
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garrisons, combined with more effective intelligence,
severed the tie between the insurgents and the villagers,
preventing the guerrillas from obtaining supplies and
information from the towns.41
The number of Filipino leaders and units surrendering
increased almost exponentially after a combination of
McKinley’s reelection, MacArthur’s new strategy, and
Frederick Funston’s daring capture of Aguinaldo in March
1901 completely demoralized them.

The following table

shows the dramatic increase in the number of insurgents
who surrendered from August 1900 to July 1901.42
Time Period

Number of Insurgent Surrenders

August-October, 1900
November-December 1900
January-February, 1901
March-April, 1901
May-July, 1901

500
2,600
1,650
13,000
4,500

MacArthur was eager to capitalize on Aguinaldo’s
capture, hoping it would cause “the complete and immediate
collapse of the revolution.”43

He billeted Aguinaldo in a

spacious villa and treated him exceptionally well.
MacArthur visited Aguinaldo daily for the next three
weeks, during which time, Aguinaldo’s “wife, mother,
sisters, and numerous prominent Federal party members”
41
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also lobbied for his cooperation.44

In return for

MacArthur’s promise to release 3000 prisoners, Aguinaldo
issued a proclamation to the Philippine people, accepting
the sovereignty of the United States and labeling an end
to hostilities “absolutely essential to the welfare of the
Philippines.”45
Aguinaldo’s capture no doubt removed some of the
stigma of surrender. In the following months, the
surrender of senior insurgent leaders such as Simon
Tecson, Mariano Trias, and Martin Delgado virtually ended
resistance in northern Luzon, southern Luzon, and Panay
respectively.46

On April 10, 1901, MacArthur wrote that he

thought Aguinaldo’s address and another offer of amnesty
“would almost instantly terminate hostilities throughout
the archipelago, insure delivery of several thousand guns
still held by insurgents, and establish peace.”47
MacArthur was mistaken:

it would take another year before

the Americans subdued the last strongholds of the
rebellion.
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CHAPTER 5

THE FINAL CAMPAIGNS

Aguinaldo’s capture and the surrender of numerous
other guerrilla leaders resulted in a widespread feeling
among the Americans that the insurrection was nearing an
end.

However, optimism quickly faded as the war entered a

particularly brutal phase, marked by atrocities committed
by both Filipinos and Americans.

Secretary of War Elihu

Root replaced MacArthur with Major General Adna R. Chaffee
on July 4, 1901; that same day William H. Taft began his
new job as the civil governor of the Philippines and the
Philippine Commission assumed legislative and judicial
authority on the islands.

Root had picked MacArthur’s

replacement in February, realizing that MacArthur opposed
implementing civilian rule of the Philippines before the
war ended.

Root informed Chaffee that one of his primary

concerns was the turnover of civil duties from the
military to the civil government.
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Chaffee began his military career as a private, but
he won a battlefield commission at Gettysburg and later
served as a cavalryman under General Sheridan.

Chaffee

earned a well-deserved reputation as a tough Indian
fighter, campaigning against the Cheyenne and the Apaches.
Leading his troop in a charge against the Cheyenne, he had
inspired his men by yelling, “Forward, if any man is
killed, I will make him a corporal!”1

Most recently,

Chaffee had served in Cuba and led American forces to
Peking during the Boxer Rebellion.

Two months after he

took over from MacArthur, the massacre of an American
company in the village of Balangiga on the island of Samar
would lead him to direct the implementation of the most
repressive counterinsurgency policies seen in the
Philippines.
Samar was the largest island in the Visayan group
with a population of over 250,000 concentrated along the
coast.

Samar was well suited for guerrilla warfare and

the Spanish had never been able to control the island
completely.

Geographically, the interior was a dense

jungle with no roads and only a few trails.

From 1899

until the middle of 1901, the Americans were unable to

1
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devote much attention to Samar, allowing insurgent General
Vicente Lukban to establish a formidable resistance
movement.

The few American units controlled only the

major towns along the coast, while Lukban and his
insurgents retained freedom of movement in the interior.2
After a visit to Samar, Brigadier General R.P. Hughes,
commander of the Visayan military district, commented that
the American forces “know nothing beyond gun shot range of
their stations.”3
Assuming responsibility for Samar on May 13, 1901,
Hughes extended the naval blockade of the island and began
active military operations, combined with extensive food
and property destruction, tactics he had used effectively
on Panay in 1900.

He ordered his subordinates to “clear

the country of all insurgents, capture the necessary
guides and compel them to do such service and generally
speaking, make the region untenable by the insurgents.”
By September 11, Hughes was reporting, “the enemy [on
Samar] has been in hiding for two months, and are liable
to stay so.”4

Under the mistaken impression that he had

successfully pacified the island, Hughes moved on to the

2
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islands of Cebu and Bohol, ending resistance there after
three months of aggressive campaigning.5
What Hughes failed to take into account was that his
policy of extensive population resettlement - some
villages more than tripled in size - and the destruction
of food and crops left the Samarenos unable to support
themselves and probably stiffened their resistance.6
Facing the prospect of starvation and possible famine, the
guerrillas became increasingly desperate.

As Hughes

thinned his forces on Samar in order to pacify Cebu and
Bohol, the insurgents also became increasingly bold.
On the morning of September 28, 1901, the insurgents
and residents of Balangiga, armed with bolos and led by
the town mayor, massacred forty-eight Americans from C
Company, 9th Infantry Regiment.

Of the thirty-five

Americans who managed to escape, fifteen later died of
wounds sustained in the attack.

Captain Edwin Bookmiller,

leader of the initial force sent to Balangiga after the
incident, found that the natives had mutilated the
victim’s bodies, beheaded the company commander, Captain
Thomas Connell, and gouged the eyes out of a dog that had

5
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served as the company’s mascot.7

The Americans’ anger

increased even more when they uncovered evidence that the
mayor, Pedro Abayan, had planned the entire affair prior
to C Company’s arrival.

In a letter to General Lukban,

Abayan had described how he would ask for protection from
the Americans and, at a “favorable opportunity, launch an
uprising against them.”8

Chaffee responded by sending

Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith, commander the 6th
Separate Brigade, to Samar.

This would prove to be “one

of the gravest blunders of the entire war.”9
Smith led an emotionally charged group of soldiers
and marines in what many perceived to be a retaliatory
campaign against the inhabitants of Samar.

Smith, who

Captain Henry T. Allen concluded was insane, issued orders
telling his subordinates to carry out the campaign with
more severity and more killing.10

The general allegedly

instructed Major Littleton Waller, commander of a
battalion of Marines on Samar, to “take no prisoners” and
“kill and burn, the more you kill and burn, the better you
will please me.”
7

Additionally, Smith told Waller to make
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the interior of Samar a “howling wilderness” and to kill
“all persons who are capable of bearing arms against the
United States.”

When Waller asked “to know the limit of

age to respect,” Smith replied that males ten years of age
were to be designated as capable of bearing arms.11

As the

Judge Advocate General of the Army later observed, “only
the good sense and restraint of the majority of Smith’s
subordinates prevented a complete reign of terror on
Samar.”12
Three months of widespread destruction accomplished
little to pacify Samar.

Forced to reevaluate his

strategy, Smith issued new guidance to his subordinates on
February 13, 1901.

His new policies were a copy of those

successfully implemented by Brigadier General J. Franklin
Bell in the Batangas province.

An American patrol

captured General Lukban five days later, but his successor
and his followers continued fighting until the end of
April, capitulating only after Smith had toned down his
approach.

His surrender ended the “longest and most

brutal pacification campaign of the entire war.”13

The

pacification campaign on Samar contrasted sharply with the

11
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one conducted by Brigadier J. Franklin Bell in the
Batangas province.
The Batangas and Taybayas provinces had been under
revolt against Spanish rule since 1896.

The insurgency

was well organized and highly developed, and the dense
tropical vegetation and mountainous terrain favored the
insurgents.14 Several prominent revolutionary leaders came
from this area, including one of the most capable, Miguel
Malvar.

Long an advocate of a strategy of attrition,

Malvar assumed command of the revolutionary forces after
Aguinaldo’s capture and attempted to revitalize the
revolution.

Chaffee, unhappy with the efforts of General

Wade and General Sumner, placed Bell in charge of the
province on November 19, 1901.15
In the words of Brian Linn, “Bell outlined the most
coherent and well-organized pacification of the war.”16
Bell commanded the 3rd Separate Brigade, which consisted of
10,000 men.

Garrison duty occupied 6,000 soldiers,

leaving him a force of 4,000 men for operations in the
field.

Malvar commanded a force estimated at 8,000 active

rebels, who were supported by a large number of
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sympathizers from the province’s population of well over
500,000 people.
Bell communicated his counterinsurgency plan to his
subordinates through a series of thirty-eight circular
telegrams.

The foundation of his plan was the separation

of the insurgents from their base of supply, the village.
Bell first ordered his commanders to concentrate the
population into protected zones by December 20.

After

that date, the Americans would consider hostile any person
found without a pass outside a protected zone and
confiscate or destroy any food found outside the zones.
By consolidating food and people, Bell ensured the welfare
of the villagers, while forcing the insurgents to live off
the land.

Eventually, over 300,000 people lived in the

protected zones.17
Additionally, Bell directed that an intelligence
network consisting of spies, loyal police, and native
scouts be used to “discover, apprehend, and punish all
agents, collectors, organizers, contributors, and
sympathizers who secretly aid or assist” those in arms.
He also exhorted his young officers to “hunt for, pursue,
and vigorously operate against armed bands of insurgents

17
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wherever they be found.”18

Bell’s mounted cavalry patrols,

led by native scouts, were ready to move quickly to
capitalize on intelligence leads such as the location of a
guerrilla band or supply base.19

The general also directed

that locals who did not turn over insurgents be arrested
or imprisoned.
Bell’s forces pursued Malvar’s insurgents so
relentlessly that they were unable to remain in place for
more than twenty-four hours at a time.

One revolutionary

soldier reported that the guerrillas were completely
“disorganized and demoralized” by Bell’s campaign.20
Malvar, who had sworn to fight to the death, surrendered
on April 16, 1902 after “finding himself without a single
gun or clerk.”21
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The United States declared the Philippine
Insurrection officially over on July 4, 1902.

In his

message to the Army in the Philippines, President Theodore
Roosevelt thanked the officers and soldiers for “their
courage and fortitude and the indomitable spirit and loyal
devotion” with which they put down the insurrection
against “the lawful sovereignty and just authority of
United States.”

However, the “peculiarly difficult and

trying task” was not complete.1

Hostilities continued in

some areas until 1903, and the United States would fight
against the Moros in the Sulu archipelago and on the
island of Mindanao until 1913.
It is important to note that no single factor led to
American victory.

While superior military skill,

equipment, and tactics helped defeat Aguinaldo’s forces in

1
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the field and civic projects and social reforms persuaded
many Filipinos to throw their allegiance to the Americans,
it was the development and implementation of a
comprehensive counterinsurgency policy that addressed the
political, social, and military aspects of the situation
in the Philippines that eventually ended the insurrection.
General Otis mistakenly believed that civic action such as
the establishment of schools, sanitation and medical
measures, and the institution of local governments would
be enough to convince the Filipinos of the benevolent
intent of the Americans.

These actions alone, however,

were not sufficient to end the conflict.

The insurgents’

use of terror proved to be a stronger incentive than the
policy of attraction initially practiced by the Americans
to gain the support from the Filipino people.

The

Filipinos stopped supporting the insurgents only when the
Americans provided protection or imposed severe penalties,
under the provisions of General Orders 100, for failing to
cooperate.
Department and district commanders, such as J.
Franklin Bell, Franklin M. Bell, Robert P. Hughes, and
Samuel B.M. Young, realized that the insurgents must be
separated from the population; otherwise, they would be
able to continue resistance indefinitely.

MacArthur
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belatedly acknowledged this and implemented martial law,
allowing his commanders to isolate the insurgents from the
people.

The newly created intelligence system enabled

commanders to disrupt the insurgent support network in the
villages by identifying and apprehending rebel
sympathizers.

Once U.S. troop strength reached an

appropriate level, the increased number of garrisons
provided physical protection to the villagers.
Additionally, the policy of population resettlement into
protected zones completely severed the ties between the
insurgents and their civilian base.

Finally, the

widespread destruction of food and crops outside the
protected zones, combined with aggressive military
patrolling led by local guides or scouts, denied the
insurgents sanctuary.
American commanders also recognized the importance of
balancing the policies of conciliation and repression, or
as Major Allen so succinctly wrote, the best policy was to
treat “the good man very well indeed and the bad man very
harshly.”2

When commanders employed these policies in the

correct proportion, as J. Franklin Bell did in the
Batangas, the result was an effective, quick campaign.
2
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Bell believed that a “short and severe war creates, in the
aggregate, less loss and suffering than benevolent war
prolonged indefinitely.”3

However, measures that were too

brutal or severe led to stiffened resistance.

As Captain

John R.M. Taylor wrote, “It is not sufficient to kill and
to destroy; a desert is not necessarily at peace.”4

This

was especially true on Samar, where Jacob Smith’s brutal
pacification campaign offered the insurgents no
alternative but to continue fighting.
The general weakness of the rebellion’s leaders also
aided the Americans.

Aguinaldo and his staff were

generally inept, with a few notable exceptions.

They had

little experience with conventional warfighting, other
than a few years of fighting against the Spanish.
Although they lacked formal training in conducting
guerrilla warfare, Aguinaldo’s subordinates waged a
relatively effective campaign against the Americans.

For

his part, Aguinaldo was able to exert very little direct
control over his fractious subordinate commanders since he
was on the run for the better part of 1900.

The rugged

geography of the Philippines also hampered his efforts to

3

J Franklin Bell, Telegraphic Circulars #5, James Franklin
Bell Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute Research
Collection, Carlisle, PA.
4
John Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1973), p. 288.

86
command and control the insurgency as much as it hindered
the Americans pursuing him.
The social, tribal, and class divisions present in
Filipino society prevented Aguinaldo from successfully
uniting the people, as ethnic rivalries overcame the
fledgling Filipino nationalist spirit, dividing the
insurgency into a series of regional conflicts.

The

Americans helped split the revolutionary movement by
providing the Filipinos with the very things the
insurgents were fighting for, namely, “individual liberty,
religious freedom, protection of personal property, an
honest and competent administration, tax reform, and the
equality of all races before the law.”5

The only thing the

revolutionaries offered that the Americans did not provide
was independence.

Aguinaldo’s attempt to appeal to the

masses by offering independence failed in the long run,
because he did not offer the social, economic, and land
reforms that many Filipinos cared about more than
independence
None of these factors, however, guaranteed American
success.

Aguinaldo’s forces outnumbered the Americans at

least two to one, an extremely unfavorable ratio in a
guerrilla war, where a relatively small number of
5
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insurgents can tie up enormous amounts of friendly troops.
Additionally, the Boxer rebellion in China drew muchneeded troops out of the Philippines during the critical
period of June 1900 - July 1901.
American success ultimately depended on the men who
implemented the counterinsurgency policies developed by
the generals - the junior officers, or in some cases
sergeants, who served as some of the 600 garrison
commanders.

These men were responsible not only for

leading their soldiers in forays against the insurgents,
but they were also charged with the establishment and
supervision of the town government, schools, and local
police force.

In addition to preventing the townspeople

from giving supplies or information to the guerrillas, the
garrison commanders were responsible for protecting the
town and his command against insurgent attacks.

They also

acted as the provost judge and performed all military
staff duties, as well as the multitude of administrative
tasks required by the army.6

Most importantly, however,

those men battled the insurgents for the allegiance of the
Filipino people, whose support would determine the success

6

Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War, 1899-1902
(Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2000), p. 284.

88
or failure of the insurgency.

As Captain John R.M. Taylor

wrote that

it was not the allure of democratic ideology or
even the promise of a bright and prosperous future
that won over the people in the barrios. Rather, it
was the local garrison commander’s force of character
that won or lost the day. Only when they were
convinced the American officer had the character, the
will, and the means to protect them did they begin to
submit themselves to his authority.7

7
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